It is a truism of American political life that the economy is an important consideration for voters at election time. After two decades or so of an economic decline that has resulted in a gap between expectations and experiences Krugman 1994, the economic perceptions, hopes, and fears that citizens harbor can mean the di erence between victory and defeat for presidential candidates. This basic fact of politics in the 1990s is nowhere better highlighted than in Bill Clinton's now-reknowned formula for presidential election success: It's the economy, stupid." His defeat of the incumbent president, George Bush, in 1992, and his reelection despite being enmeshed in scandal in 1996, provide powerful vindication that the economy looms large in the presidential choice of American voters Nagler 1995, 1998. At the same time, these two contests raise the question of precisely what it was about the economy that moved voters since the economy itself was not a simple issue in either of them. In addition to the perennial issue of whether the incumbent president had done a goodjob of managing the economy, voters had a clear economic alternative to the pro-free trade Democratic and Republican candidates, the protectionist third party candidate, Ross Perot. In 1996 the presidential candidates' debates about the economy focused not only on how well the economy had performed in recent years, but also on how certain voters could bethat objective measures of economic performance | unemployment, in ation, growth of GNP | captured their labor market experiences in a rapidly changing global economy. In this paper, we argue that conventional measures of economic attitudes, based on retrospective evaluations of short-term changes in economic performance, fail to capture an important element of voters' contemporary economic attitudes: insecurity. Measures of job insecurity based on questions from a novel New York Times 1996 post-election survey capture attitudes distinct from retrospective evaluations of the economy. In a multinomial probit model of vote choice, job insecurity explains the Perot vote, while other studies of the Perot vote in 1992 and 1996 have found con icting evidence that it is unrelated to economic perceptions. Our model also includes abstention as a choice, demonstrating how people's evaluations of eco-nomic performance and economic insecurity in uence their choice to abstain or to vote in presidential elections. We end by speculating that economic insecurity i s a n increasingly important determinant o f v ote choice in the new global economy, and it is likely to be exploited by the major parties, as well as by third-party m o vements, in future U.S. elections.
The Economy and the Perot Vote: Misplaced Emphasis
A staple of competition in presidential contests for some time has been the economic feelgood" factor. Incumbents try to persuade voters that they have managed the economy well during their term in o ce, while challengers strive to convince voters that the opposite is the case. Candidates focus on economic change in the short term, with one side making the case for improvement o ver recent y ears and the other for deterioration and better prospects under a change in leadership. Accordingly, political scientists have generally taken the position that economically driven voting results from voters' perceptions of short-term changes in personal and national economic performance.
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That is, citizens are more likely to reward an incumbent if they perceive, or expect, a favorable change in personal egocentric or national sociotropic economic conditions over the last, or next, year or two Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Lewis-Beck 1990; Anderson 1995. 2 This analysis is predicated on the argument that the egocentric and sociotropic performance judgments that form the foundation of contemporary economic voting studies may b e w ell suited to capturing the normal ebb and ow of support for the major party candidates, but they do not always capture the complexity of economic 1 There have been some variations on this theme. Conover and Feldman 1985, for example, focus on the role of anger, whereas Conover 1985 and Mutz and Mondak 1997 go beyond egocentrism and sociotropism to look at the e ect of group-based economic perceptions. Most of the economic voting literature, however, has the focus described in the text. This analysis devotes its attention to survey-based economic voting research. There is a large body of similar research using aggregate data and looking at the relationship between uctuations in the macroeconomy unemployment and in ation in particular and patterns of government support. A recent review is Nannestad and Paldam 1994. In the particular context of the United States, see also the recent debate between MacKuen et al 1992 and Clarke and Stewart 1994. voting in presidential elections. Voting for third party candidates is an altogether di erent reaction from throwing one's support behind the major party c hallenger in a t of passing economic dissatisfaction. The two forms of anti-incumbent v oting | supporting the major party opposition or supporting third-parties | are simply not equivalent. It is widely accepted that, historically speaking, Americans have opted for the third party alternative when, among other things, they do not have faith in either candidate's capacity to govern, when neither nominee appears to represent their concerns, and when both parties appear incapable of providing prosperity. When the two political parties violate their implicit pact with the people, citizens can either sit out the election or abandon the major parties to support a third party alternative" Rosenstone et al. 1996, 126 .
In short, third party v oting has been a distinctive form of anti-incumbent v oting because it re ects a lack of con dence in both the Democratic and Republican parties and not just the incumbent president from one or the other of them. This disillusion may be the product of any number of factors, not just the economy. Concern over race and urban unrest, for example, fanned popular support for George Wallace in 1968 Rosenstone et al. 1996, 110-15 . The important point is that citizens sometimes attach value to issues that the Democratic and Republican parties for whatever reasons choose to ignore, and political entrepreneurs emerge to ll the gap and take electoral advantage of it. Ross Perot was no di erent. We argue, and demonstrate with survey data from the 1996 presidential election, that the economic issue captivating large numbers of Americans in the 1990s, and of which Ross Perot took advantage, had nothing to do with short-term performance and everything to do with individual and collective job insecurity.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that studies have found a weak relationship at best between egocentric and sociotropic performance judgments and voting for Perot. A study of the 1992 presidential contest, for example, claims "one of the most important ndings" of their multinomial probit model is that it was Clinton the Democratic challenger, not Perot, who obtained a great deal of his support from voters dissatis ed with the state of the national economy" Nagler 1995, 738. See also Asher 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996. 3 When these same authors replicated their analysis for the 1996 election, however, they found a modest e ect for sociotropic pessimism on the Perot vote Alvarez and Nagler 1998. In general, researchers have had di culty explaining the Perot vote. Relying on retrospective evaluations of the national economy to explain Perot's support is potentially misleading. Short-term uctuations in individual and national economic performance are simply not the economic discontent on which Perot candidate sought to capitalize. Rather, he targeted a malaise arising from a sense of job insecurity prevalent in the United States in the 1990s. This insecurity is rooted in Democratic and Republican presidential candidates' unquestioning acceptance of the liberal economic philosophy that turbo-charged capitalism' accelerated change fueled by global free trade and domestic deregulation is the only way to run an economy" Luttwak 1996. We h ypothesize that egocentric and sociotropic performance judgments were complemented in 1996 by a sense of job insecurity that did not a ect the Democratic-Republican voting division, but it did help to drive voters into the Perot camp. Our test of this hypothesis falls into two parts. The rst part establishes that insecurity is a di erent economic concern both conceptually and empirically from matching egocentric and sociotropic short-term performance judgments. The second part con rms that insecurity has di erent behavioral implications in terms of its impact on voting choice, but, contrary to most thinking on third parties, it does not a ect abstention. The concluding section of the article makes the argument for the relevance of these ndings beyond the 1996 election. The conclusions of individual studies do not always agree. As stated in the body of this article, Alvarez and Nagler, for example, conclude that Clinton, not Perot, was the major bene ciary of sociotropic pessimism, while Miller and Shanks 1996, 453 conclude more tentatively that perceptions of the national economy appear to have had a major positive impact on voters' choices for Perot instead of Bush..." These conclusions are not readily reconcilable since the two studies use di erent analytical procedures and techniques and examine di erent independent v ariables; the Miller and Shanks analysis, for example, excludes African-American respondents and ignores egocentric economic assessments. For our purposes, however, estimation di erences are less signi cant than the question of whether short-term egocentric and sociotropic assessments are the economic forces that we should properly be looking at to understand the economic discontent that underlies support for Ross Perot.
In the absence of attention to the phenomenon of job insecurity in academic surveys, our analysis relies on a pair of unique New York Times surveys designed speci cally to investigate this economic malaise in the U.S. population. The rst of them was conducted some 12 months before the 1996 presidential contest and the second of them immediately after it.
Economic Insecurity
Economic insecurity is most often de ned by its opposite. Economic security, which is a part of our total welfare, can bede ned as a state of mind or sense of well-being by which an individual is relatively certain that he or she can satisfy basic needs and wants, both present and future" Reida 1994, 5. A secure person, then, can be relatively certain" of satisfying basic needs and wants" both now and in the future, whereas an insecure person does not enjoy the same con dence in her ability to do so. Job insecurity is worth measuring in election surveys for at least four reasons.
First, media coverage of the economy suggests that Americans as a whole came to feel more insecure over the course of the 1980s and 1990s as economic competition globalized, labor market conditions became less worker-friendly and the market assumed greater responsibility for the provision of bene ts and services that were previously the responsibility o f g o vernments. To the best of our knowledge, survey evidence tapping the evolution of insecurity o ver time does not exist. Indeed, there is little cross-sectional survey material on the phenomenon. Evidence of journalistic concern abounds, however. Perhaps most notable are The New York Times' series 4 In both surveys, the data are weighted to take account of household size and number of telephone lines into the residence and to adjust for variations in the sample relating to geographic region, race, sex, age, and education. Unfortunately, even the The New York Times lacked the prescience to investigate the role of job insecurity in explaining Ross Perot's historic performance in the 1992 presidential election. The result is that we can measure change only from the time this newspaper turned its attention to this phenomenon, i.e., December 1995 New York Times 1996 To the best of our knowledge, there are no earlier similarly detailed and rich economic insecurity surveys available in the public domain. Both the 1995 and 1996 surveys are available from the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut where their archive n umbers are USNYT95-012 and USNYT96-96012B respectively. of feature articles on downsizing in December 1995 New York Times 1996 and PBS Newshour's week-long series of features in March 1996 on the apparent paradox of corporate pro ts and Wall Street experiencing record growth, while many workers faced declining wages and job insecurity www.pbs.org newshour bb economy.
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Second, uncertainty lies at the heart of job insecurity, and recent work demonstrates the profound in uence of voter uncertainty on political choice Alvarez 1997. Uncertainty about the economy can be rooted in, for example, fears of being unable to provide for oneself and or one's family if the social security system collapses or if the rolling back of the welfare state threatens unemployment and national health insurance for the elderly and the poorPeterson 1996; Thurow 1996, 242-70. Alternatively, the uncertainty may stem from changes in employment practices and conditions in an increasingly deregulated and competitive global economy. Indeed, ordinary people can beexpected to beparticularly sensitive to such labor market changes since their jobs and the bene ts attached to them, e.g., tenure, remuneration levels, and health care, are the principal source of the wherewithal needed for peace of mind during their working life as well as their retirement. Put di erently, conditions of employment, and not just employment itself, have profound implications for most people's ability to satisfy basic needs and wants like food,housing and education for children, as well as, by extension, for their mental and physical health, marital stability, and ability to cope with life generally Gallie et al 1993.
Third, employment uncertainty may lie at the root of job insecurity, but it is not co-terminous with it Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt 1984. Fear of job loss turns into insecurity only if individuals are not con dent of nding another job or if the jobs they can nd do not carry the same bene ts as the one they have lost, or fear losing. Simply nding another job was not a serious problem for most Americans in the mid-1990s. During his campaign for re-election, President Clinton made much of his administration's creation of 8.5 million non-farm jobs and of a consequent drop in unemployment from over 7 percent in January 1993 the month he became president to 5.6 percent in March 1996 Council of Economic Advisers 1996, 1. 6 Nonetheless, peace of mind was not the norm in the population. In a period of growing anger...over layo s, corporate downsizing and stagnant incomes," Pitts 1996 many Americans feared that if they lost their job, they would not be able to nd as good a one to replace it. Moreover, this was precisely the fear to which the pro-free trade Democratic and Republican candidates turned a deaf ear and, at the same time, on which Ross Perot played. In 1992 he had vigorously opposed trade deals like the North American Free Trade Association NAFTA for encouraging the exportation of jobs to lower wage economies. In 1996, he again stressed emphatically in his statement of principles: I am not against international trade. I am against stupid trade deals that take away American jobs and increase our trade de cit. I w ant to create good-paying sic jobs here in the United States" www.perot.org principles trade.htm. Moreover, it was in everyone's interest, he argued, to put an end to the insecurity that went with the exportation of well-paid jobs since then other problems would solve themselves. A good-paying sic job is the ultimate welfare reform...It does not make sense to be discussing welfare reform at a time when we are sending overseas the very jobs people need to end their dependence on welfare assistance" www.perot.org principles welfare.htm.
Fourth, security judgments are not the same as short-term performance ones and this is because they tap evaluations of di erent dimensions of the economy. Many people may believe that economic conditions | both theirs and the nation's | are improving while also believing that a small shock such as job loss could lead to irreversible economic hardship. Conversely, a person may feel that her own or her country's economic fortunes have deteriored over the last year or so and or are likely to deteriorate in the near future without at the same time feeling that her ability to satisfy present and future basic needs and wants is threatened. The person in question may, for example, feel secure in a well-paying job and be in the position to absord short-term reverses in the form perhaps of a lower-than-usual salary raise. This is not to argue, of course, that this con dence cannot give w ay to uncertainty about the ability to satisfy basic needs and wants. The person's job security, for example, might become threatened or her con dence eroded by short-term economic adversity being compounded over the medium to long term. Nonetheless, there is no necessarily close relationship between economic performance and job insecurity, and their distinctiveness is mirrored in di erences in the kinds of people who harbor them, as we shall now show.
Types of Economic Concern Compared
It is not our argument that economic security and performance judgments are mutually independent in the public mind. This is an unreal expectation. Economic perceptions in general, for example, can be driven by partisanship, with presidential party l o yalists being uniformly more optimistic than opponents. Similarly, negative assessments of short-term individual and collective economic performance change may make some contribution to a sense of job insecurity. A person might think that his ability to satisfy basic needs and wants is only made worse by a deterioration over the last year or two in his personal nancial circumstances. Alternatively, he may have enough savings or accrued bene ts that his sense of insecurity i s f o r the moment una ected by such c hange in the short term. The point is that substantial independence, and not mutual exclusivity, is to be expected of the two types of economic concern.
Independence is immediately suggested by their di erent distributions in the population at large. At the time of the 1996 election, 21.5 percent of Americans thought that the economy w as getting worse, and 26.7 percent of them believed that they themselves had fallen behind nancially in the past couple of years. By contrast, a much larger 49.4 percent were sociotropically insecure in the sense that they thought the best years for good jobs for American workers were in the past, and 38.8 percent were egocentrically insecure in the sense that they thought unemployment imminent and were not con dent that good jobs at good wages could be easily found in their community. 7 The insecure were far from always being pessimistic in the short term, and vice versa. For example, no more than 34.4 percent of the sociotropically insecure i.e., those thinking the best times for good jobs for Americans had passed felt at the same time that the national economy was getting worse, and only 35.2 percent of them felt that they themselves had fallen behind nancially over the past couple of years. The matching gures for the egocentrically insecure those both fearing unemployment and living in communities where good jobs are scarce are 30.6 percent and 42.3 percent. Table 1 presents the c measure of association for every pair of perceptions of the economy. All of the pairings are statistically signi cant, p : 01, indicating that the none of the pairs are strictly independent. However, all of the c are lower than one might expect if these economic perceptions were simply mirroring one another. The highest association between economic judgments is between personal economic performance and personal job insecurity, but it is a mere .31. Surprisingly, personal job insecurity and national job insecurity are only loosely related c = :19, indicating that national job insecurity is not simply re ection of insecurity about one's own job. Table 1 about here An important reason why the the two t ypes of economic concern are substantially independent of each other is that di erent kinds of people are beset by them. Table   7 The sociotropic economic performance question is: Do you think the economy is getting better, getting worse, or staying about the same?" Its egocentric counterpart is: In the past couple of years would you say y ou have been getting ahead nancially, just staying even nancially, or falling behind nancially?" In both cases, we h a ve coded the variable as 1 better, 2 the same, 3 worse. Job insecurity is measured very di erently. Following the counsel of Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt 1984, 443, egocentric insecurity i s a n i n teractive function of two questions. The rst is: How worried are you that in the next 12 months you or someone else in your household might be out of work and looking for a job for any reason very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried at all?" The second question is: In your community these days, how easy is it for someone who is trying to nd a job to get a good job at good wages very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat hard, or very hard?" An insecure person is de ned operationally as someone who is very" or somewhat" fearful of unemployment AND thinks it very" or somewhat" hard to nd a good job in their community. In its sociotropic form, the measure is: When it comes to the availability of good jobs for American workers, some say that America's best years are behind us. Others say that the best years are yet to come. What do you think?" Both insecurity measures are dummy v ariables, where insecurity is coded 1. Don't knows are excluded in all calculations.
2 presents an analysis of the characteristics of the people responding pessimistically to the sociotropic and egocentric performance questions on the one hand and the sociotropic and egocentric insecurity questions on the other. Predictor variables include party identi cation, age and education, measured as a series of dummy variables to allow for the possibility of non-linearity in their relationship to the economic perception variables. Age is a good example. People aged 65 and over are unlikely to bemore concerned about goodjobs for themselves, and possibly even for other Americans, than younger people still in the labor market. The baseline categories are independent" for party identi cation, over 64" for age and not a high school graduate" for education. Table 2 about here The striking feature of the results is the distinctiveness of performance as opposed to insecurity concerns, at least in regard to the type of people who hold them. This is evident in demographic characteristics varying widely in their impact on the di erent types of economic concern. Moreover, the same characteristics often predict in di erent directions to the egocentric and sociotropic dimensions of the two types of judgment. Membership of a high income group consistently predicts that a person is economically secure and happy with their own and the nation's economic performance. Union members, by contrast, may, as might beexpected, feel that the best times for goodjobs for Americans have passed, but they do not feel at the same time that their own personal nances have deteriorated in the last couple of years. Women are similar in that they too are sociotropically insecure, but are also of the view that the national economy is getting better in the short term. The distinctiveness of response patterns can also beseen in the two youngest age groups betraying a sense of personal insecurity and national security, whereas high school graduates have the opposite mindset, personal security coupled with national insecurity. 8 Repondents were placed in one of six income categories: i under $15,000; ii $15,000-$30,000; iii $30,000-$50,000; iv $50,000-$75,000; v $75,000-$100,000; and vi over $100,000.
The examples could continue, but the larger point is that di erent kinds of people emerge as having di erent mixes of economic concerns. Relative to those 65 years of age and older, for example, all age groups have a sense of personal job insecurity, and their sense of personal insecurity heightens as they get older. Yet, older Americans are more insecure about collective job prospects for future generations. The e ect of age on economic performance evaluations is less clear. The same variation characterizes education. Relative to those who do not graduate from high school, all education groups have less of a sense of personal job insecurity. High school graduates, by contrast, are less sanguine about the future of good jobs, as are women and union households. It is di cult to avoid the conclusion that job insecurity, both sociotropic and egocentric, is a distinctive problem weighing on the minds of many Americans whose personal characteristics and quali cations leave them vulnerable to the perceived declining availability of goodjobs in the changed labor market of the neo-liberal U.S. economy.
The question now is whether the two types of economic judgment are equally distinctive when it comes to the question of their e ect on political behavior.
Performance, Insecurity and Behavior
To recapitulate brie y, existing research on the 1996 election has concluded that negative evaluations of the economy helped the Republican challenger, and, to a lesser extent, the third party candidate, Ross Perot Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Lacy and Grant 1998. There is ample reason to expect that an additional widespread concern in the 1990s, and one ignored by the Democratic and Republican candidates, was individual and collective job insecurity. O ering an alternative c hoice to the major party candidates and to abstention, Perot spoke loudly and clearly to this concern, inviting the insecure to vote for him and thereby visit a curse on both unresponsive major party presidential candidates. Our expectation, therefore, is that short-term performance judgments may well have implications for anti-incumbent voting in the form of supporting the Republican challenger, Bob Dole, instead of Bill Clinton, but that insecurity w as more consequential for two other crucial choices that people had to make: whether to turn out and vote at all and whether to vent disillusion with the two major parties by v oting for Ross Perot.
The analytical technique we use to test this hypothesis is multinomial probit MNP. We use multinomial probit instead of the more easily implemented multinomial logit for two reasons. First, multinomial logit assumes "independence of irrelevant alternatives," IIA or that the ratio of the predicted probability o f c hoosing candidate A over candidate B is una ected by the presence or absence of candidate C or any other alternative, for that matter. Applied to the 1996 U.S. presidential election, this requires that there is no unobserved stochastic component to our model such that the predicted probability o f choosing Clinton over Dole is una ected by whether Ross Perot is in the race. MNP avoids imposing IIA on the data since the errors from the model are assumed to bedistributed multivariate normal with an estimable matrix of error correlations.
Second, multinomial probit provides the exibility for us to include abstention as an alternative i n a v ote choice model without making overly restrictive assumptions about the structure of the voting decision. For example, one might conceive of the vote decision as a nested decision where a person rst decides whether to vote and then, after deciding to vote, decides for whom to vote. In such a model, one might worry that the errors for abstention are correlated with the errors for each of the remaining choices. Alternatively, the voting decision might bedescribed by an exit, voice, and loyalty" model where voters rst decided whether to vote for the incumbent loyalty, and, if they decide not to support the incumbent, then decide whether to vote for a challenger voice or to abstain exit. It is unclear how abstention should be nested in choice model. We adopt the view that nested models are optimal when the choice is clearly structured. For example, Timpone 1998 presents a nested model where people rst decide whether to register to vote and then, after registering, decide whether to vote. Registering to vote is clearly a choice that precedes the decision to vote. However, we see no clear reason to expect that deciding whether to vote precedes one choice of candidates, and, in fact, a person's decision whether to vote may depend heavily on the choice of candidates. In this sense, multinomial probit can generalize nested models.
We include abstention as a choice in order to test fully our hypothesis that job insecurity partly explains the Perot vote in 1996, including how Perot supporters were similar to people who did not vote. 9 We conceive of the decision to vote and the decision for whom to vote as part of the same model in which individuals have utility for each of the candidates and for abstaining from the election. Though the theoretical debates on turnout have failed to generate a clear rationale for voting, we accomodate in our model both a rational voting model Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich 1993 and a sociological model Rosenstone and Wol nger 1978; Wol nger and Rosenstone 1980; Teixeira 1987 . In the model we develop, the bene ts of voting for a candidate or of abstaining are a function of socioeconomic group membership, partisanship, and evaluations of the economy. 10 We rely on a random utility model in which a person has utility for each of the candidates and for abstention. Furthermore, Lacy and Burden, forthcoming, argue that including abstention in vote choice models is necessary in order to obtain accurate parameter estimates.
10
While the New York Times survey provides new and interesting questions about the economy, it omits questions about policy preferences and evaluations of the candidates that other voting studies traditionally include.
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While it may sound odd to speak of a utility for abstaining, recall that utility captures the di erence between the bene ts of a choice and the cost of a choice. For the case of abstention, the variables in our model capture both the bene t of voting and cost of becoming informed or going the polls especially our measure of education. ij is the error term associated with i's utility for j. Given that choice 1 2 f 1; 2; 3g is the baseline category for purposes of di erencing utilities, then is: We estimate and using maximum likelihood. To identify the model, we m ust impose restrictions on both and . must have at least one xed element Bunch 1991; Keane 1992. To impose restrictions on , we begin with the undi erenced . Since we are primarily concerned with unobserved heterogeneity in the error covariances across pairs of choices, we assume that j j = 1; 8j, or that error variances are homoskedastic.
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This normalization implies that j k is a correlation. We also assume that Clinton;Dole = Clinton;P erot =0 since we believe that the variables in our model best explain a vote for the incumbent over each of the challengers. These restrictions are su cient to induce one xed element o f .
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Even with the appropriate restrictions on , MNP models su er from fragile identi cation" unless the model also xes some elements of Keane 1992. Table 3 about here   Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial probit analysis of the 1996 presidential contest.
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With the incumbent president, Bill Clinton, as the baseline, it details how a range of sociodemographic characteristics and economic perceptions a ect the likelihood of voting for Bob Dole, Ross Perot or not voting at all. In terms of voting for the Republican candidate, Table 3 contains no surprises. Women and the youngest age group were more likely to vote for the Democratic incumbent, 14 We obtain parameter estimates in Limdep 7 NLOGIT 1.1 using the Broyden-FletcherGoldfarb-Shanno BFGS maximization algorithm. We obtained estimates of Pij numerically. Estimating the four-choice model, including calculating predicted probabilities, took 1 hour on a P entium 233mhz with 64MB RAM. 15 We also estimated all models with heteroskedastic-consistent White standard errors, nding no di erences in substantive results. while Republican identi ers, whites, higher income groups, and higher education groups tended to choose Bob Dole. Equally as expected, the dissatisfaction of those seeing the national economy a s h a ving gotten worse or their own personal nancial situation as having deteriorated tended to be translated into an anti-incumbent Republican vote. When it comes to job insecurity, by contrast, Bob Dole drew electoral advantage from neither the egocentric or sociotropic insecurity prevalent among American citizens in 1996.
The picture is almost exactly reversed when it comes to the third party candidate, Ross Perot. Of the personal characteristics of respondents, only gender and union membership had an impact in the duel between him and Bill Clinton, with women and union members showing a signi cant tendency to remain in the Democratic camp. The economy also mattered, but, in direct contrast to the short-term performance judgements that worked to Bob Dole's advantage, it is egocentric and sociotropic insecurity judgements, and especially the latter, that advantaged Ross Perot vis a vis the incumbent Democratic president. The third party candidate's protectionist campaign propaganda condemning the job loss record of both major parties turns out to have been a classic third party strategy for loosening the electoral stranglehold of the hegemonic Democratic and Republican parties.
Contrary to expectations, neither egocentric nor sociotropic insecurity has implications for abstention. However, the belief that the national economy has worsened does distinguish non-voters from Clinton supporters, suggesting that perceptions of the economy in uence voter turnout see also Lacy and Grant 1998. This di erence would suggest that abstention is a relatively routine reaction to dissatisfaction with the incumbent president's stewardship of the economy in the short term, while voting for a third party signals a more fundamental discontent rooted in the perceived failure of both major parties to speak to voters' pressing economic concerns. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, therefore, this analysis brings into question whether abstention and voting for a third party are equivalent measures of disillusion since both would appear not to be equally likely responses to the popular disillusion that comes when the two political parties violate their implicit pact with the people" Rosenstone et al 1996, 126 . Table 4 about here A convenient way of summarizing the implications of the di erent economic concerns for the choices people made in the 1996 presidential contest is to establish the baseline probability o f c hoosing each alternative b y an individual scored at the mean on all the variables in Table 3 . This probability is given in the rst column of Table 4 , and an estimate can be calculated of the amount b y which i t c hanges when the individual in question moves from an optimistic to a pessimistic position on each of the economic variables. Thus, for example, the likelihood of the person voting for Clinton decreases by seven percentage points if she thinks her personal nances have deteriorated over the last year or two. This table allows percentage estimates to be associated with the three main conclusions to be drawn from our analysis. First, performance judgments can be seen to more important than security ones by a magnitude of at least three to one in the explanation of anti-incumbent Republican voting. Second, insecurity judgments are more important than performance ones in explaining anti-incumbent third party v oting by a magnitude of around two to one. Finally, compared to performance judgments, insecurity is clearly inconsequential for predicting abstention.
Conclusion
The basic issue that this analysis of presidential choice in 1996 has been intended to highlight is that there can bemore to the economy for voters than short-term egocentric and sociotropic performance judgments. The feelgood factor that these judgments represent may be unique in that it is consistently present in elections where the contestants for o ce accept some responsibility for managing the economy. Other, cross-cutting and often more transient concerns can arise, however, as national economic circumstances change and, for example, highly publicized trade de cits mount or corporations move their operations overseas to take advantage of cheaper, perhaps non-unionized labor. The point about such concerns is that they are not necessarily surrogates for short-term performance judgments because they often tap into popular hopes and fears that transcend the last year or two and may even involve concern for the economic prospects of future generations. Moreover, being qualitatively di erent stimuli for voters, they risk having di erent political consequences than short-term performance judgments. To ignore this this possibility is to take the chance of underestimating both the aggregate importance of the economy for election outcomes and the scope and complexity of the economic motives driving individuals' political choices.
This analysis has shown that failing to take account of the widespread sense of job insecurity in the 1996 presidential election leads to the erroneous conclusion that retrospective e v aluations of the economy played a role in explaining voting support for the third party candidate, Ross Perot. The feelgood factor plays no such role once we control for feelings of job insecurity, which distinguish Perot voters from supporters of the major party candidates and from non-voters. It is probable as well that President Clinton's success in appeasing this sense of insecurity is instrumental in explaining the decline in Perot's share of the presidential vote from 19 percent in 1992 to seven percent in 1996. While data on the distribution of egocentric and sociotropic insecurity are not available for the 1992 contest, we do know that 55.3 percent of respondents to a December 1995 New York Times survey felt the best years for good jobs for Americans had passed and 44.0 percent of them felt a sense of personal job insecurity. Eleven months later, after the 1996 presidential contest, these gures had fallen to 50.7 and 40.7 per cent respectively. In other words, the drop in Perot's share of the vote would likely have been less steep had the election been held earlier or had the sense of insecurity in the population not receded to some degree.
There is every indication that job security will remain an issue in the next presidential contest at least. The unquali ed advocacy of free trade on the part of President Clinton and his predecessors has placed the increased competition from low-wage economies in the developing world rmly on the U.S. political agenda. There are even indications that, in the best tradition of third party politics in the United States, the issue will be coopted by the major parties and its third party appeal defused. With their sights on the party's presidential nomination and seeking to di erentiate themselves from vice-president and free trade advocate, Al Gore, Democrats like House Minority Leader, Dick Gephardt, have used the metaphor of American workers being caught up in a race to the bottom" and advocate a very di erent trade policy of protectionism and economic nationalism. Moreover, he appears to be sowing his seeds for the Democratic nomination in the year 2000 in fallow ground. "Protectionist sentiment, normally a sign of bad times, is ourishing among the American people despite a growing economy and a low unemployment rate" Levinson 1996, 2. Nor does Gephardt seem to bethe only elected representative to be listening. A particularly vivid demonstration of the potency of the free trade issue came with the House Democratic party's refusal in November 1997 to renew President Clinton's fast track" authority to negotiate trade deals, making him the rst president to be denied this prerogative since it was rst granted to Gerald Ford in 1974. One commentator interpreted this denial as the strongest con rmation yet that American politics is in the throes of a nationalist transformation " Beinhart 1997, 20 .
The national economy is a complex entity. Voter evaluations of the economy are equally complex. To reduce the electoral implications of the economy to the feelgood factor misses important economic attitudes such as insecurity that, as we have shown, help to explain electoral support for the third party canddidate, Ross Perot, in the 1996 U.S. presidential election. The free trade policy pursued by the current administration will likely to make job insecurity a n e v en more salient issue for voters and candidates in the future. . First di erences represent c hange in variable from lowest to highest value: Personal economy better to worse, National economy better to worse, Personal insecurity 0 to 1, National insecurity 0 t o 1 .
